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Abstract 
 
This paper studies a dynamic error correction model (ECM) highlighting the 
consequences of regime changes and of credibility on the performance of real 
exchange rates during stabilization. The analysis shows that the structural 
parameters of the ECM, from which an equilibrium real exchange rate is 
calculated, will be subject to structural breaks reflecting regime and credibility 
changes. Empirical evidence is presented on the Mexican 1988 and 1995 
stabilization episodes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
One of the most relevant aspects of stabilization is the appreciation of real 
exchange rates.  This behavior is common among different nominal anchors, 
especially exchange rate based and money based stabilization.  This stylized 
fact, which is well documented in Calvo and Végh (1999), and more recently 
in Fisher et al. (2002), has inspired a literature under two broad approaches.  
The first, focuses on a framework that assumes the real exchange rate starts 
out at its steady state level prior to stabilization and that several aspects of the 
program cause a subsequent appreciation. The second shows that as a 
consequence of internal and external misalignments, the real exchange starts 
out off equilibrium and converges to its steady state after stabilization policies 
are implemented.   
Within the former framework, however, there has been two potential 
explanations. One understands that various aspects of stabilization lead to 
higher aggregate demand, raising nontradable prices and causing a real 
appreciation of the exchange rate. Calvo and Végh (1993) argue that if 
stabilization is not credible, consumers will increase spending while 
conditions remain stable.  Uribe (1995) and Roldos (1995) view inflation as a 
tax that, when reduced through stabilization, will boost investment and 
consumption. Rebelo and Végh (1994) highlight that fiscal reforms associated 
with stabilization programs reduce the need for distortionary financing, 
increasing permanent income, leading to higher consumption. Finally, Erceg 
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and Levin (1996) argue that structural reforms found in most stabilization 
programs, cause a higher desired for capital stock, leading to increases in 
output.  
The second explanation holds that during stabilization, inflation is 
slow to decline to international levels due to overlapping contracts, imperfect 
credibility, and backward looking expectations that under nominal exchange 
rate stability or a fixed nominal exchange rate anchor, leads to an appreciation 
of the real exchange rate. Rodríguez (1982) models nontradable inflation as 
depending on excess demand for nontradable and upon expected inflation, 
which is assumed to adjust sluggishly to changes in actual inflation.  In 
Dornbusch and Werner (1994) inflation depends on wage growth, which is 
determined by expected inflation and proxied by lagged inflation. In this two 
cases, the slow adjustment of prices under a fixed nominal exchange rate 
causes a real appreciation of the exchange rate. In Edwards (1994) wage 
growth depends on the credibility of the stabilization program.  If the program 
is less than fully credible and under a nominal exchange rate anchor, 
nontradable inflation resulting from wage inertia leads to a real appreciation 
of the exchange rate. 
In the later framework, however, balance-of-payments misalignments 
and a highly devalued nominal exchange rate prior to stabilization cause the 
real exchange rate to be depreciated relative to its equilibrium level. In turn, 
this gap causes inflation in nontradable prices, which under a nominal 
exchange rate anchor, leads to a real appreciation of the exchange rate.  
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Notably, this last approach has not been well explored in the literature. 
Kamin (2001) proposes a partial adjustment mechanism, and tests the model 
using a dynamic specification and Mexican data.  He finds that inflation in 
Mexico is well explained by an error-correction model (ECM) linking the real 
exchange rate to detrended absorption.   
Under this framework, an equilibrium exchange rate is estimated and 
compared to the observed real exchange rate during the 1988 Mexican 
stabilization program.  The results show that inflation continues until a 
balance is reached between the real exchange rate and its equilibrium level, 
and allow a clear understanding of the potential real exchange rate gap that 
must be corrected before inflation fully stabilizes.  One advantage of this 
approach is the successful blend of both equilibrium and inertial theories in an 
ADL-ECM format that reconciles the contribution of each explanation to the 
appreciation of the real exchange rate after stabilization.  One limitation, 
however, is the lack of a theoretical framework in developing the partial 
adjustment ADL-ECM. A rigorous supporting background could provide 
useful insights in understanding the fundamentals behind the behavior of real 
exchange rates during stabilization.  
This chapter illustrates that such partial adjustment mechanism is 
broadly consistent with a two-goods, tradables/nontradables, model with an 
optimizing social planner that switches stabilization preferences to contain 
inflation.  Interestingly, the analysis reveals that by allowing a policy game 
and a probability of success to stabilization, the structure of the ECM will be 
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subject to structural breaks reflecting changes in stabilization preferences and 
credibility. The analysis of structural breaks in the cointegration vector is of 
interest in the empirical literature on stochastic integrated process (see, for 
example, Gregory and Hansen, 1996; Saikkonen and Liutkepohl, 2000); 
although, a theoretical framework linking structural breaks and regime shifts 
is still unclear, at least, within the stabilization literature (Quintos and Phillips, 
1993).  
The present investigation tackles this gap. Firstly, it provides a 
framework for understanding the links between structural breaks and regime-
credibility changes that are present during stabilization. Secondly, the results 
have important implications regarding the size of the gap consistent with 
inflation stability. If changes in stabilization preferences and credibility are 
large, the gap could disagree substantially from the one ignoring structural 
breaks.  As a consequence, an inadequate treatment of these structural changes 
could mislead the authorities in the design and management of exchange rate 
policies. 
The model is applied to the Mexican 1988 Pacto program and the 
1995 ERBS plan introduced after the Tequila crisis of 1994.  In what remains, 
section 3 highlights the Mexican reforms and stabilization episodes of 1988 
and 1995.  Section 2 develops the theoretical framework.  Section 4 presents 
the data and empirical results.  Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Stabilization and structural reforms in Mexico 
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Before proceeding with the formal modeling strategy and econometric 
exercise, it is important to highlight some of the salient features of the 
Mexican ERBS programs of 1988 and 1995. The Mexican Pacto, starting in 
1988, and the ERBS introduced after the Tequila crisis of 1994, shared a 
number of features.  The Pacto program led to a drastic opening of the 
economy, deregulation and privatization of state-owned companies, and a 
exchange rate based stabilization supported on restrictive fiscal and monetary 
policies.   
  The program had three stages.  In the first, between February and 
December of 1988, the nominal exchange rate was fixed, meanwhile nominal 
wages provided an anchor for inflation.
1
  Between January of 1989 and 
November of 1991, devaluation was preannounced and set below the inflation 
rate under parity. However, the amount by which the peso devalued was 
progressively diminished as the anchor consolidated.  In November 1991, 
some flexibility was allowed to the exchange rate under a band with a sliding 
ceiling and flat floor.  The band was kept until October 1994 when NAFTA 
became a considerable issue, and pressures from political and other internal 
developments, that ultimately led to the December 1994 crisis, required the 
introduction of a new stabilization program in 1995.  
                                               
1 The Pacto was in fact a consensus among the government, the private sector and labor 
unions which, on an annual basis, provided a forward looking solution to the establishment of 
prices, wages and exchange rate changes (see, Dornbush and Werner, 1994) 
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  The new stabilization plan of 1995 was an extension of the Pacto 
program, reinforcing many of the reforms already in place (Werner, 1994).  In 
particular, 1995 was also an ERBS with one important difference:   The new 
program did not implement a devaluation band, returning to a fix nominal 
exchange rate anchor that was later allow to grow under parity as the program 
consolidated.  
  A fundamental aspect of these programs and one that has attracted 
considerable attention in the literature, was the fashion in which wages were 
set.  Both the Pacto and the 1995 programs provided a forward looking 
mechanism in the formation of inflation and wage expectations.  The forward 
looking scheme did not attenuate inertial inflation, however, and caused a 
significant appreciation of the real exchange rate after the 1988 Pacto (see 
Edwards, 1996), and the 1994 Tequila crisis (see Edwards, 1998).   
  After 1988, the appreciation of the currency led to capital inflows that 
allowed to finance large and unsustainable current account deficits.  In the 
same fashion, after the 1995 program, foreign capitals returned and the same 
strategy was followed, until 1998 when a devaluation of the currency cleared 
some of the accumulated misalignments. 
  Two important question still remain, however: Was the potential gap 
between the actual and the equilibrium real exchange rate consistent with the 
observed macroeconomic performance after both programs were introduced?  
And if so, was monetary policy and its credibility in part responsible for the 
difference? Some analysts argue that in the early stages of the Mexican Pacto, 
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the currency was well undervalued, providing a comfortable cushion for the 
real exchange rate to appreciate.  The analysis shows that the Mexican peso 
was undervalued in both the 1988 and 1994 episodes, although the 
misalignment was larger in 1988. The results also suggest that the 1995 
program performed better than the 1988 Pacto, in part due to a greater 
credibility component.  
 
3. The model 
 
This section presents a model that captures many of the salient features of the 
Mexican 1988 and 1994 programs. In particular, the forward looking 
mechanism in the formation of wage expectations, as well as the credibility 
aspect of the programs that was evident when the anchors went under 
considerable pressure, are important contributions.   
  This is a small open economy in which the monetary authorities follow 
a devaluation “real target” rule defined by2 
 
1 ttt xes  ,    (1) 
 
                                               
2 The term “real target” is somewhat misleading as it denotes two different types of polices.  
Some authors refer to it as PPP rule; while others define it as a policy aimed at 
accommodating changes in real exchange rate fundamentals.  This type of regime has being 
followed historically by many countries, especially in Latin America,  and is understood to be 
one of the fundamental causes of high inflation equilibrium (see, for example, Hamann, 1999). 
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where ts  is a real exchange rate index, te is the nominal “spot” exchange rate, 
 ttt ppx  is the gap between local and foreign prices,   is a difference 
operator and   is a parameter that measures the weigh that past inflation 
differentials have over the real exchange rate. 
  In addition, the monetary authorities have an imperfect control of the 
nominal exchange rate by means of an official instrument t , such that 
 
ttte    ,    (2) 
 
where  2,0~  Nt  is a random term capturing the imperfect “speculative” 
response of the nominal exchange rate to the policy instrument. 
  Following a variant of a standard framework, this economy produces 
tradable and nontradable goods.
3
 Tradable prices are related to international 
prices under the law of one price 
 
 tt
T
t pep ,    (3) 
 
While nontradable prices are determined by domestic supply and demand.  
Demand responds to a measure of excess nontradable pressures and by the 
real exchange rate; whereas, supply is determined by real wages that are 
                                               
3 In particular, we follow a variation of Edwards (1998) model. 
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measured in terms of nontradable prices.  At equilibrium, nontradable 
inflation is given by
4
 
 
ttt
T
t
N
t Awepp 3211   ,   (4) 
 
where tw  are nominal wages and tA  is detrended domestic absorption, 
assumed to follow a random walk process given by 
 
ttt AA  1 ,     (5) 
 
where  2,0~  Nt  is a demand shock.5   In (4), the   parameters, derived 
from the equilibrium condition in the nontradable market, are given by 
)( 1111 sdd  , )( 1112 sds   and )( 1123 sdd  , where 01 d  is 
the price demand elasticity of nontradable, 02 d  is the expenditure elasticity 
demand for nontradable, and 01 s  is the real product price supply elasticity 
of nontradable.  
                                               
4 The equilibrium condition is defined by 
 
   NNT pWSAppD , , 
 
where the parameters in (4) are a combination of the supply and demand eslasticities after 
differentiation. Note that in principle, equality should not strictly hold, as the difference can be 
satisfied through trade. 
5 In Edwards (1992), excess demand pressures are approximated by changes in domestic 
credit, whereas in Edwards (1996) by detrended real M2.  In this setup, and following Kamin 
(2001), excess demand pressures are approximated by detrended industrial production. 
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  Nominal wages are defined as a weighted average of past inflation 
differentials and the “surprise” changes in the official instrument t .  
Specifically, 
 
    11 1   ttttt xEw  .   (6) 
 
  In (6), which is one of the fresh contributions of the paper, 1tE  is an 
expectations operator conditional on the information set and   is the weight 
placed on forward looking expectations.  If 1 , wages are set according to 
the expected changes in monetary policy, whereas if 0 , they are 
determined according backward looking inflation expectations. 
  From equations (3)-(6), aggregate inflation, which is an average of 
tradable and nontradable inflations, is given by 
 
  ttttttt AeEx    11 ,   (7) 
 
where, for simplicity and without loss of generality, all coefficients were 
normalized to unity.   
  Notice that expectations remain explicit in (7) as there exists a policy 
game with a sequence of events in which expectations are followed by a 
speculative shock and then by a policy response with the use of the imperfect 
instrument.  In reaction to the shock, the monetary authorities try to adjust the 
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nominal exchange rate in an effort to minimize an objective loss function à la 
Edwards (1998). 
 
  2211   tttttt ssxELE  ,   (8) 
 
where  measures the preferences between inflation and real exchange rate 
targets, and ts  is an equilibrium real rate.
6
  
  Finally, and following Kamin (2001), the equilibrium real exchange 
rate is a decreasing linear function in domestic absorption 
 
tt bAas 

.     (9)  
 
3.1. Pre-stabilization equilibrium 
 
The problem of the monetary authorities implies minimizing equation (8) with 
respect to t  and subject to equations (1), (2), (7) and (9), taking expectations 
as given.  The first order condition for the optimization problem is given by 
 
      011 1111   ttttttt xeasAbE  .  (10) 
                                               
6 These loss objective functions provide a very convenient framework when analyzing 
inflation stabilization episodes, as the introduction of a stabilization program implies a change 
of preferences towards greater inflation control with lower values of .  In the case of a pure 
ERBS,  = 0. 
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Substituting the policy rule (2) in (10) and taking expectations gives  
 
    
1
1
1 1111

 

 ttttt xsAbaE .     (11) 
 
Lastly, substitution of (11) in (10) provides the optimal path for 
inflation 
 
  tttttt ssexx    111 ,     (12) 
 
which is expressed in ECM transformation with   )1(1 2   , a strength 
of adjustment coefficient given by )1( 2  , and an equilibrium real 
exchange rate, derived from the normalized ECM, given by  
  
  tt Abas 
 .    (13) 
 
Note that all “deep” structural parameters in (12) and (13) depend on 
the choice of stabilization preference  .  In particular,   has undefined limits 
when 1  and is negative for 1 , which has an important policy 
implication.  Since the condition for stability, under stationarity, requires that 
10  , the only rational policy for inflation stability would be 
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]15[0
2
1   ; otherwise, any value above or below these limits would 
result in an explosive inflation path.  It might be possible, however. that 
because of political and other institutional arrangements, values of   above 
the upper limit are chosen, leading to a high inflation equilibria.   For 
example, it could be the case of a monetary authority that “fears floating” 
(Calvo and Reinhart, 2002) and is more inclined in keeping the exchange rate 
overly appreciated, leading to a higher inflation equilibria.  
In addition, the slope of the equilibrium real exchange rate also 
depends on  . This structural dependence, which is set in the inflation 
process as well as on the ECM, results from agents anticipating the choice of 
policy preferences in the formation of expectations. Higher preferences 
towards real exchange rate control will result in a lower equilibrium and, in 
the case that 0b , will change the direction in which tA  affects the 
ECM., switching from a Balassa-Samuelson to a Pigout type effects and vice 
versa. 
 
3.2. Stabilization under a nominal anchor 
 
A nominal anchor under a stabilization program is understood as a change of 
preferences to a value of 0 . Consequently, in this particular case, the 
inflation gap disappears such that 0 tx , and the implicit equilibrium real 
exchange rate becomes 
  
15 
  
tt bAas 
 .     (14) 
 
with a strength of adjustment given by 0 .  The fact that 0 , implies 
that the ECM is no longer present in the inflation process as such corrections 
are not necessary when inflation is fully anchored under a stabilization 
program.
7
 Note the resemblances of equation (14) and (9), implying that under 
stabilization the equilibrium real exchange rate returns to its fundamentals. 
 
3.3. Credibility 
 
The issue of credibility during stabilization has been well analyzed in the 
literature (see, Agenor and Taylor, 1992).  The conventional way of 
incorporating credibility in the inflation dynamics is by placing a probability 
of success to the stabilization program (see Edwards, 1996).
8
  In particular, it 
is assumed that agents assign a value  1,0q  to the probability that the 
program will be maintained, treating it as a credible commitment rule. That is, 
there is a probability of success such that the authorities will behave in a 
manner consistent with equation (14), and a probability  q1  that the pre-
                                               
7 Empirically, if a pure ERBS is successfully introduced, one would observe a non-significant 
ECM on an inflation equation such as (12). 
8 The analysis on credibility has also been extended to evaluate the determinants of such 
probabilities, mainly in terms of fiscal and monetary factors (Prazmowski, 2002). 
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stabilization rule, equation (13), will be maintained. This means that inflation 
becomes a weighted average of pre and post-program dynamics, such that 
 
        tttttt ssqeqxqx    111 111    (15) 
 
with an equilibrium real exchange rate given by 
 
   tt Aqbas 
 1 ,   (16) 
 
with a strength of adjustment equal to )1( q .9  
There are several important conclusions derived from equations (15) 
and (16).  Firstly, both the slope and strength of adjustment of the ECM 
depend on the underling probabilities assigned to the program.  The greater 
the probability of success, the lower the slope and the speed of adjustment of 
the ECM, implying a lower equilibrium and less dependence on the ECM for 
stabilizing inflation. This means that a less than fully credible anchor will 
decrease both the equilibrium towards which the real exchange rate needs to 
converge in order to fully stabilize inflation, as well as the speed of 
convergence towards such equilibrium.  As a consequence, inflation will take 
longer to adjust making the stabilization effort more vulnerable to exogenous 
shocks.  
                                               
9 Note that   represent pre-stabilization preferences that are assumed to remain constant after 
the program is introduced. 
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Secondly, if the program is fully credible, with 1q  for example, 
local inflation would immediately converge towards world inflation (i.e., 
0 tx ).  In this case, as in Edwards (1998), inertial inflation disappears and 
the equilibrium real exchange rate will again return to its fundamentals, 
equation (14).   Finally, the slope of the equilibrium real exchange rate could 
be negative or positive depending on the probability of success after the 
program is introduced. For example, one may empirically observed a slope 
that changes signs reflecting different regime perceptions on the success of the 
program.  Hence, changes in q  will be reflected as structural breaks in the 
ECM from witch the equilibrium real exchange rate is calculated.  These 
structural breaks can be interpreted as changes in agents’ perceptions on the 
success of stabilization, providing an important feedback about the 
performance of the program. 
 
4. Empirical evaluation  
 
This section presents the econometric exercise for the estimation of 
 
  tttttt ssexx    11110 ,      (17) 
 
with an equilibrium real exchange rate defined by 
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tt As  
 ,     (18) 
 
where a  and    qb  1 , and a strength of adjustment given by 
 q 1 .  Equations (17) and (18) will be estimated for Mexico using 
quarterly, seasonally adjusted data for real de-trended log industrial 
production as a proxy for absorption ( A );
10
 domestic inflation ( p ), 
calculated as log changes in the consumer price index (CPI); world inflation, 
calculated as log changes in the United States (US) CPI ( p ); log changes in 
the nominal exchange rate ( e ), and the log of a real exchange rate index ( s ), 
calculated as the ratio of the US CPI to local CPI times the nominal exchange 
rate between Mexico and the US ( PEP ).  The data set ranges from the first 
quarter of 1981 up to first quarter of 2001, including the Pacto program 
implemented in January 1988 and the 1995 ERBS after the Tequila crisis of 
1994.  Data source, description, and construction are presented in the 
appendix. 
  Before turning to the formal econometric exercise, the integration 
consistency of the series will be verified using the Augmented Dickey and 
Fuller test. Table 1 shows that the price gap and the nominal exchange rate 
follow first order integrated I(1) processes; whereas, the real exchange rate 
and de-trended industrial production follow I(0) processes, providing a 
consistent stationary structure.  In addition, Figure 2 illustrates a clear 
                                               
10 Detrending was carried out using Hodrick and Prescott (1997) filter. 
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cointegrated relationship between the real exchange rate and de-trended 
industrial production.  Cointegration is also confirmed in Table 2 by a 
Johansen (1991) test that shows at least one cointegrated relationship. 
  Table 3, on the other hand, shows the estimation of equation (17).
11
  
All relevant statistics, as well as the significance and direction of the 
underlying coefficients, are in order.  The intercept of the inflation equation is 
negative, the coefficient on detrended industrial production is positive, and the 
strength of the adjustment coefficient, equal to 0.09 (0.03, p < 0.001), is 
positive and close to zero, implying that there exists a stable ECM that 
corrects inflation differentials at a very slow pace.  Figure 3 and the ADF test 
on the residuals ( 001.0,66.8  p ) revealed stationarity, confirming the 
ECM (Engle and Granger, 1987). The normalized ECM corresponding to 
equation (16), is given by
12
 
 
    tt
As
06.11.0
33.325.0  .    (19) 
 
  As expected, equation (19) indicates that the equilibrium real exchange 
rate is decreasing in detrended industrial production. In particular, for every 
percentage point that industrial production growth above trend, the 
equilibrium real exchange rate, consistent with a zero inflation gap, falls by 
                                               
11 The estimation was carried out using an IV method. The instruments chosen were the lags 
of the log changes in the exchange rate, inflation differentials and detrended industrial 
production.  The lengths of the lags were selected using various information criteria.  
12 See Bårdsen (1989) for details on estimating the standard errors of the normalized ECM. 
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about 3⅓ of a percentage points.  In the absence of demand pressures, 
however, the equilibrium real exchange rate  is about 1.28 Mexican pesos per 
US dollars. 
 Turning to the structural stability of (19), the theoretical conclusions 
suggest that the structural parameters of the ECM will move over time 
reflecting changes in stabilization preferences and success probabilities.  In 
particular, if q is time dependent due to program success perceptions, (18) 
becomes 
 
ttt As  

    (20) 
 
where t  is the time-varying-coefficient (TVC).
13
   
  Figure (4) compares the actual and the equilibrium real exchange rate 
calculated under equations (18) and (20). The results show some interesting 
conclusions:  During the 1988 program, the estimated ECM calculated under 
the TVC approach departs significantly from the constant coefficient 
alternative, although both calculations tend to converge after the 1994 Tequila 
crisis.  This suggests two things.  First, it shows that structural changes do 
matter in the calculation of the ECM, and that those changes could 
significantly affect the conclusions derived from an equilibrium approach to 
                                               
13 See Hamilton (1994) for a technical discussion of TVC techniques.   In particular, the TCV 
methods is an updating algorithm in which equation (17) and (18) are estimated using the first 
k observations, where k is the number of coefficients to be estimated in (17), and new 
observations are added until T-k coefficient estimates are obtained.  These T-k estimates are 
termed time varying coefficients (TVC). 
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the real exchange rate.
14
  Secondly, the convergence observed after 1994 
suggest that parameter stability was achieved with the 1994 stabilization 
attempt.   In order words, after 1994 the recursive approach coincides with the 
full sample estimate. 
  Figure (4) also suggests that the observed real exchange rate index was 
considerably more depreciated than both measures of equilibrium prior to the 
1988 program.  However, the correction required was significantly larger 
according to the TCV approach.  The disequilibria gradually disappeared as 
the program consolidated until achieving convergence in 1994. Convergence 
was slow, apparently due to a less than fully credible program, resulting in a 
considerable degree of inflation persistence, real exchange appreciation and 
inflow of foreign capital that helped finance large and unsustainable current 
account deficit.  The deficit lead to the 1994 crisis.  
  A somewhat different story holds after the 1994 Tequila crisis.  
Starting in 1994, the observed real exchange rate index overshooted as a result 
of several political and socio economic factors, the NAFTA controversy of 
October 1993, and pressures coming from current account misalignments.  In 
contrast to the 1988 episode, however, both measures of equilibrium jumped 
in 1995 reflecting the significant slow down in industrial production.  The 
correction of the real exchange rate required to stabilize inflation under the 
new 1995 anchor was significantly smaller than during the 1988 Pacto.  After 
                                               
14 Keep in mind that 20 observation were allowed for initialization when calculating the TVC.  
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1995 and similar to the 1988 case, the disequilibria between the observed and 
equilibrium measures gradually disappeared, fully converging in 1999. 
  Why these two episodes are significantly distinct, specially in the size 
of the gap that was required for inflation stability? This question can be better 
understood using the conclusions derived from the changes in credibility that 
occurred during both stabilization programs and the information inherent in 
the movements of t .  Figure 5 shows the TVC estimate of the slope of the 
ECM alongside the standard error bands.
15
  According to the theoretical 
results, this coefficient should vary over time reflecting changes in the success 
probabilities of stabilization. The greater the success probability attributed to 
the program, the smaller will be the slope coefficient of the ECM.  The results 
show additional interesting conclusions.  With the introduction of the Pacto in 
1988, the slope felt sharply indicating a credible stabilization anchor.  This 
drop continued until 1990 when it started reverting back, coincidently the time 
when the monetary authorities implemented the second phase of the program 
with the introduction of a devaluation strategy.  Accordingly, this approach 
probably signaled a lost of the anchor and a reversal towards the pre-
stabilization “real target” regime. The model suggests that the lost of 
credibility on the anchor, caused the slope to increase steadily until 1994 
when the Tequila crisis exploded and the new IMF program was introduced.   
                                               
15 The evolution of the constant using the TVC method revealed, as expected from the model, 
that it remained fairly constant through the sample period. 
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  After the introduction of the new program in 1995, the slope felt 
sharply again and continued decreasing as credibility on the new anchor 
gradually consolidated.  The slope and hence the credibility on the success of 
the new program settled below the post-stabilization level of 1988.  In this 
regard, the results suggest that the stabilization effort of 1995 was more 
credible and indeed successful than the 1988 episode. It is important to 
mention that the devaluation strategy followed in the 1988 program was 
abandoned after the Tequila crisis and is perhaps one of the fundamental 
reasons why the 1988 Pacto lost credible.    
 
5. Conclusions 
 
This paper developed a framework that allows understanding the implication 
of changes in stabilization preferences and success probabilities in the 
evolution of an equilibrium real exchange rate index during stabilization.  In 
doing so, the analysis shows that regime and credibility changes will alter the 
post-program structural characteristics of the equilibrium real exchange rate.  
This hypothesis was tested on the Mexican 1988 and 1995 stabilization 
episodes.  The findings revealed that the observed real exchange rate could 
converge to a higher or lower equilibrium, or move away from it, depending 
on a combination of aggregate economic activity, policy objectives and 
credibility.  
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  In particular, the results suggest that the 1988 Pacto program rapidly 
gained credibility, but it was lost when a more flexible exchange rate policy 
was allowed in 1990.  A lower probability of success, a considerable degree of 
real exchange rate appreciation, a fragile financial system, large current 
account deficit financed by capital inflows, and other political and internal 
developments, ultimately led to the 1994 Tequila crisis and the introduction of 
a new stabilization program in 1995.  The new program was shown to be more 
credible than the 1988 Pacto. In general, the proposed theoretical model, 
incorporating policy preferences and credibility, provides an adequate 
description of inflation and real exchange rate dynamics during the Mexican 
1988 and 1994 stabilization episodes, and could provide important feedback 
on the performance of alternative stabilization policies. 
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Table 1 Stationarity test based on ADF 
The data is available by request to the authors.
† Estimation sample is 1981.1-2001.1 
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level under MacKinnon (1991) critical 
ADF
†
-1.46
 -3.65*
-1.65
 -5.23*
 -3.05**
 -8.79*
 -4.46*
 e
  s
 s
   A
Variable
 p-p
*
  p- p
*
  e
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Table 2 Johansen cointegration test (RER and detrended industrial production) 
Null hypothesis r = 0 r = 1
Eigenvalue  0.28* 0.11
trace 23.75 6.29
trace 95% critical value 19.96 9.24
trace 99% critical value 24.60 12.97
max 17.46 6.29
max 95% critical value 15.67 9.24
max 99% critical value 20.20 12.97
Note: * and ** denote rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% and 5% level under Osterwald-Lenum
(1992) critical surface. The statistics ltrace and lmax are the trace and maximal eigenvalues under
Johansen (1991) cointegration test. Vector autoregression includes constant term. Estimation sample is
1988.1-2000.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
H0 r = 0; H1 r  1 H0 r  1; H1 r = 2 
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Table 3 IV regression results for the inflation gap (xt) 
Variable Coefficient
a -0.16
(2.80)
  s t-1 0.09
(2.89)
   A t-1 0.30
(2.07)
 e t 0.12
(2.79)
  x t-1 0.68
(4.91)
R
2  
(adjusted) 0.77
N (adjusted) 79

2
 (regression) 0.03
DW 2.04
ADF  -8.66*
Note: * and ** denote significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.  t-statistics in parenthesis.
Estimation sample is 1981.1-2000.1 using White's (1980) Heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance.
ADF critical surfase based on MacKinnon (1996) one-sided p-values.
*
*
*
*
**
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Data definition Table 
Variable
P MEX Consumer Price Index (1995=0)
P* USA Consumer Price Index (1995=0)
E Nominal Exchange Rate (MEX$/US$)
A MEX Detrended Industral Production
Data is drawn from the Intenational Monetary Fund IFS (CD).  
The data is available by request to the authors.
† Sample is for 1981.1-2001.1 
Definition
†
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Figure 2 log (1/RER) vs. log of detrended industrial production 
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Figure 3 Residuals from inflation equation (Table 3) 
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Figure 4 Observed vs. equilibrium RER (constant and TVC cases) 
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Figure 5 TVC slope of normalized ECM 
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